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Assessing Students’ Civil Rights Claims Against
School Resource Officers
By Kerrin C. Wolf, JD, PhD1
Abstract
Police officers stationed in public schools, commonly referred
to as school resource officers (SROs), have become commonplace
in the United States over the past twenty-five years. Their
primary responsibility is to maintain order and safety in schools,
but they also serve as counselors and mentors for students, and
teach classes related to drug and alcohol abuse, gang avoidance,
and other topics. SROs’ presence in schools raises important
legal questions because they interact with students on a daily
basis and are directly involved in schools’ efforts to control
student behavior through school discipline and security.
Additionally, a series of Supreme Court decisions has created an
environment of limited rights for students in America’s public
schools, which is compounded by the heightened security
environments found in the majority of schools. Amidst this
environment, it is important to consider whether students have
any recourse if SROs take actions that seemingly infringe on
students’ rights. This article seeks to address this specific
question by analyzing students’ civil rights claims against SROs
under Section 1983. The available case law demonstrates that
the involvement of SROs in school discipline matters can quickly
escalate these situations to include aggressive, physical
confrontations and arrests for relatively minor misbehavior. Yet,
Section 1983 rarely provides students with viable civil rights
claims against SROs, even when the SROs’ behavior seems
egregious. These cases lend strong support to scholars and
advocates’ concerns that the use of SROs, along with other
heightened school security and punitive discipline measures,
1. Kerrin C. Wolf is an Assistant Professor of Law at Stockton University,
and completed a J.D. at the William and Mary Law School and a Ph.D. at the
University of Delaware School of Public Policy and Administration. The author
would like to thank Susan DeJarnatt and Jason P. Nance for their insightful
comments on drafts of this article.
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“criminalizes” public school students. They also demonstrate
that changes in the ways SROs operate in schools are needed to
protect students’ rights.
Keywords: education law, school discipline, civil rights, school
resource officers
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If a seventh grader starts trading fake burps for
laughs in gym class, what’s a teacher to do? Order
extra laps? Detention? A trip to the principal’s
office? Maybe. But then again, maybe that’s too old
school. Maybe today you call a police officer. And
maybe today the officer decides that, instead of just
escorting the now compliant thirteen-year-old to
the principal’s office, an arrest would be a better
idea. So out come the handcuffs and off goes the
child to juvenile detention.2
I. Introduction
Over the past two decades, school resource officers (SROs)
have become commonplace in American public schools.3 SROs
are trained police officers stationed in schools, typically
pursuant to an agreement between school districts and the
officers’ police departments.4 Their primary responsibility is to
maintain order and safety in schools, but they are also asked to
serve as counselors and mentors for students, and to teach
classes related to drug and alcohol abuse, gang avoidance, and
other topics.5 SROs’ presence in schools raises important legal
questions because they interact with students on a daily basis,
and are directly involved in schools’ efforts to control student
2. A.M. ex rel F.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1169 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing in dissent that the school resource officer’s
actions were not protected by qualified immunity against a civil rights claim
by the arrested student).
3. See infra Part I.
4. SROs are sometimes referred to as school liaison officers, school
security officers, or other designations. Importantly, they are distinct from
security guards employed directly by schools or school districts, though similar
designations are sometimes used to refer to security personnel in these roles.
SROs are employed by police departments, are answerable to their police
supervisors, and operate within the confines of the agreement between their
police departments and the schools/school districts in which they are stationed.
See, e.g., Ben Brown, Understanding and Assessing School Police Officers: A
Conceptual and Methodological Comment, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 591 (2006).
5. See, e.g., Mark Keierleber, Why So Few School Cops are Trained to
Work with Kids, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.theatla
ntic.com/education/archive/2015/11/why-do-most-school-cops-have-nostudent-training-requirements/414286/. For a discussion of the increased use
of SROs over the past 25 years, see infra Part I.
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behavior through school discipline and security efforts.6
Additionally, students’ rights are significantly curtailed in
schools because of a desire to maintain safety and order, which
alters the legal rules that guide these frequent interactions.7 A
series of Supreme Court decisions has created an environment
of limited rights for students in America’s public schools.8 This
includes limited free speech rights, limited rights against
searches and seizures, other limits on student privacy, and
differing interrogation rules. The effect of these limited rights
is compounded by the heightened security environments found
in the majority of schools, including closely monitored student
movements, strict dress codes, strict behavioral expectations,
and other security apparatuses and policies.9
Prior legal scholarship has explored how this environment
of limited rights and heightened security affects students’ rights
in their interactions with SROs, such as SROs’ searches and
interrogations of students.10 Elizabeth Shaver and Janet Decker
recently conducted a detailed analysis of interactions between
SROs and students with disabilities, including a review of recent
lawsuits filed against SROs by such students based on several

6. See, e.g., School Resource Officers, NAT’L SCH. SAFETY & SECURITY
SERVS., http://www.schoolsecurity.org/resource/school-resource-officers/ (last
visited Mar. 19, 2018) [hereinafter School Resource Officers]; What is a School
Resource Officer?, COPS: COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVS.,
https://cops.usdoj.gov/supportingsafeschools (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
7. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of
Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 124 (2004). For a complete discussion of
students’ diminished rights in schools, see infra Part II.
8. See, e.g., Randall R. Beger, The “Worst of Both Worlds”: School Security
and the Disappearing Fourth Amendment Rights of Students, 28 CRIM. JUST.
REV. 336 (2003); Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 124-31; Barry C. Feld, T.L.O
and Redding’s Unanswered (Misanswered) Fourth Amendment Questions: Few
Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847, 950 (2011).
9. See, e.g., AARON KUPCHIK. HOMEROOM SECURITY: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN
AN AGE OF FEAR 2-3 (2010); Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison? The
Criminalization of School Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY
79 (2008).
10. See Elizabeth A. Bradenburg, School Bullies - They Aren’t Just
Students: Examining School Interrogations and the Miranda Warning, 59
MERCER L. REV. 731 (2008); Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda: Policing
Interrogation in the Twenty-First Century Schoolhouse, 52 LOY. L. REV. 39
(2006); Peter Price, When is a Police Officer an Officer of the Law: The Status
of Police Officers in Schools, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 541 (2009).
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different legal theories.11 Yet, beyond students with disabilities,
investigations of students’ potential legal remedies against
SROs who may have infringed on their rights have been rare.12
This article seeks to address this specific question by
analyzing students’ civil rights claims against SROs under
Section 1983.13 The analysis demonstrates that students’
potential civil rights remedies against abuses by SROs are quite
limited because of the considerable leeway provided to SROs in
their interactions with students by existing student rights
jurisprudence.
Additionally, SROs’ dual roles as law
enforcement officials and school administrators have made their
legal status in their interactions with students unclear. This
significantly undermines students’ abilities to pursue Section
1983 claims against SROs because the SROs can raise the
qualified immunity defense, which defeats Section 1983 claims
when the government officials’ actions do not clearly violate
established rights. Additionally, because applicable laws and
school rules are particularly controlling of student behavior,
SROs can more readily justify their more aggressive and
antagonistic interactions with students.
In addition to analyzing civil rights claims against SROs
under Section 1983, this article will also explain the roles of
SROs in schools, the reasons for their increased presence in
schools, and their place among other heightened security and
strict discipline policies that have infiltrated America’s public
schools over the past twenty-five years. It will then detail the
various ways in which student rights are limited in schools,
including how these limitations affect interactions between
SROs and students. Then, the article will explore Section 1983
11. Elizabeth A. Shaver & Janet R. Decker, Handcuffing a Third Grader?
Interactions Between School Resource Officers and Students with Disabilities,
2017 UTAH L. REV. 229.
12. The only exception to this is the work of Barry Feld, who notes that
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on student’s rights against unreasonable
searches has significantly curtailed students’ ability to recover under Section
1983 when they are searched. See Feld, supra note 8, at 950.
13. This article will focus on federal civil rights claims. Notably, there
are a variety of other claims that may be available in certain situations,
including state law claims and, as Shaver and Decker explore, claims under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) that students with disabilities may be able to pursue.
See generally Shaver & Decker, supra note 11.
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claims against SROs specifically by analyzing existing federal
court opinions that have assessed such claims. Finally, this
article will contend that a clear standard should be set for SROs’
interactions with students in school. Rather than continuing to
treat SROs as hybrids between police officers and school
employees, which muddles students’ rights in their interactions
with SROs, courts should consistently apply the same standards
that they apply to police officers working on the street to SROs
in schools.
SROs should also be removed from schools’
disciplinary responses to minor student misbehavior. These are
the most effective ways to provide protections for students’
rights in their interactions with SROs.
II. Understanding SROs
The National Association of School Resource Officers
(NASRO), the primary membership organization for SROs,
defines SROs as “commissioned law-enforcement officers
selected, trained, and assigned to protect and serve the
education environment.”14 Typically, SROs are assigned to a
school or set of schools based on an agreement between the local
police department and the local school district.15 According to
the “triad” model of school-based policing, SROs are expected to
serve three roles in their schools: law enforcement officer,
counselor, and educator.16
In the law enforcement role, they both monitor schools for
safety issues and disorder, and respond to incidents of student
misbehavior, which can include taking part in the disciplinary
response by the school. SROs also help schools prepare for active
shooter events and other emergencies.17 They monitor their
14. Nat’l Ass’n of Sch. Res. Officers, To Protect and Educate: The School
Resource Officer and the Prevention of Violence in Schools, NASRO.ORG (2012),
https://nasro.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/NASRO-To-Protect-andEducate-nosecurity.pdf.
15. For a discussion of these agreements and variations on schools’
relationships with SROs and other police officers, see Lisa H. Thurau &
Johanna Wald, Controlling Partners: When Law Enforcement Meets Discipline
in Public Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977 (2009).
16. School Resource Officers, supra note 6.
17. David C. May, Stephen D. Fessel & Shannon Means, Predictors of
Principals’ Perceptions of School Resource Officer Effectiveness in Kentucky, 29
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schools on a daily basis by walking the halls or watching security
camera feeds.18 They might also be involved in screening
students and school visitors as they enter school buildings to
ensure they are not bringing weapons, drugs, or other
contraband into the schools.19 In addition to these activities
focused on maintaining safety, security and order, they also
respond to incidents, such as fights, disorderly students, and
other violations of criminal laws or school rules.20 This can
include playing a role in resolving these incidents, but also
arresting misbehaving students for alleged violations of criminal
law.21
In the counselor role, SROs are expected to form meaningful
relationships with students to help guide them away from
delinquency and towards success in school. To fulfill this role,
SROs sometimes serve as coaches for schools’ athletic teams or
form informal mentorship relationships with students in the
school.22 In the teacher role, SROs also lead classes related to
their law enforcement experience.23 This can include Drug
Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) or similar sessions
focused on drug abuse, classes on gang avoidance, or classes on
criminal law and the role of police in society.24
AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 75 (2004).
18. Aaron Kupchik & Nicole L. Bracy, To Protect, Serve, and Mentor?
Police Officers in Public Schools, in SCHOOLS UNDER SURVEILLANCE: CULTURES
OF CONTROL IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 21-37 (Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres
eds., 2009).
19. See, e.g., KATHLEEN NOLAN, POLICE IN THE HALLWAYS: DISCIPLINE IN AN
URBAN HIGH SCHOOL 41-44 (2011).
20. Id.
21. See Kerrin C. Wolf, Booking Students: An Analysis of School Arrests
and Court Outcomes, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 58 (2013).
22. Peter Finn et al., Comparison of Program Activities and Lessons
Learned Among 19 School Resource Officer (SRO) Programs (Mar. 2005)
(unpublished report), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209272.pdf;
Kupchik & Bracy, supra note 18, at 23-27.
23. Ida M. Johnson, School Violence: The Effectiveness of a School
Resource Officer Program in a Southern City, 27 J. CRIM. JUST. 173 (1999).
24. Anna Harvey, School Resource Officer Develops Friendship with
Students, Staff, CARTERET COUNTY NEWS-TIMES (Jan. 3, 2015),
http://www.carolinacoastonline.com/news_times/article_888a3794-938e-11e49f98-77539cba085f.html; John Rosiak, How SROs Can Divert Students from
the Juvenile Justice System, 8 DISPATCH (Community Oriented Policing
Services,
D.C.),
May
2015,
http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/052015/sros_and_students.asp.
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While school-based police officers have existed for many
decades, their rise to prominence began in the 1990s. During
the 1980s and early 1990s, crime in the United States, including
juvenile delinquency and crime in schools, became a prominent
policy issue.25 Crime rates broadly, and crime in schools more
specifically, peaked in the early 1990s.26 A wide variety of
legislation was enacted at the federal and state level to combat
crime, including the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, which included funding for the placement of police officers
in America’s school through community oriented policing
The number of SROs in schools expanded
programs.27
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, due in part to highly
publicized incidents such as the shootings at Columbine High
School in Colorado.28 Additional federal funding for SROs was
provided by The Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities
Act.29 Currently, the Department of Justice estimates that there
are approximately 19,000 SROs nationally.30
SROs are one feature of a larger trend – the
“criminalization” of American public school students.31 This
term has been used by scholars to describe the incorporation of
criminal justice techniques as tools to control and discipline
students.32 Beyond employing police officers in schools and
using arrests to respond to student misbehavior, schools have
incorporated the following: controlled access to and movement
25. Russell J. Skiba, Reaching a Critical Juncture for Our Kids: The Need
to Reassess School-Justice Practices, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 380 (2013).
26. See Scott Neuman, Violence in Schools: How Big a Problem Is It?,
NPR (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/16/148758783/violence-inschools-how-big-a-problem-is-it.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (2016).
28. Lynn A. Addington, Cops and Cameras: Public School Security as a
Policy Response to Columbine, 52 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1426 (2009); Ben
Benton, Not All School Systems Have Resource Officers, but Most are Eyeing
Them After Sandy Hook, TIMES FREE PRESS (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/story/2013/mar/11/pencils-paperand-police/102094/.
29. NATHAN JAMES & GAIL MCCALLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43126,
SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS: LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN SCHOOLS (2013).
30. See Keierleber, supra note 5.
31. See Hirschfield, supra note 9; Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource
Officers and the Criminalization of School Behavior, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 280
(2009).
32. See, e.g., Hirschfield, supra note 9.
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within schools, including requiring identification badges;
security cameras; metal detectors; random suspicion-less
searches of persons, personal property, and lockers, sometimes
with drug sniffing dogs; use of restraints such as handcuffs; and
the installation of metal bars and gates.33 Additionally, schools
widely adopted strict discipline policies, including “zero
tolerance” policies, which require school administrators to use
exclusionary school discipline measures such as suspensions in
response to a wide array of both serious and minor acts of
student misbehavior.34 These policies were encouraged by
federal legislation that attached funding to schools’ adoption of
zero tolerance policies for weapons and drug offenses, but states
and school districts expanded their scope to a wider array of less
serious misbehavior.35
These heightened security measures and strict disciplinary
approaches have received a wide array of criticisms. For
example, advocates and scholars suggest that they feed “the
school-to-prison pipeline” by exposing students to frequent
exclusions from school that derail their academic progress and
propel them towards lives of criminality.36 Moreover, they may
expose students to unfair or unreasonable treatment, such as
discipline responses that are outsized compared with students’
misbehavior. The media frequently covers stories of students
facing suspensions for seemingly benign behavior,37 and studies
33. Id.
34. ZERO TOLERANCE: RESISTING THE DRIVE FOR PUNISHMENT IN OUR
SCHOOLS (William Ayers, Bernardine Dohrn & Rick Ayers eds., 2001);
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES
SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE (2000); Jason P. Nance, Students, Police and the School-to-Prison
Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 919, 932-33 (2016).
35. Jeanne B. Stinchcomb, Gordon Bazemore & Nancy Riestenberg,
Beyond Zero Tolerance: Restoring Justice in Secondary Schools, 4 YOUTH
VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 123 (2006); See Nance, supra note 34, at 932-34.
36. See, e.g., DANIEL J. LOSEN & TIA ELENA MARTINEZ, CTR. FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS REMEDIES, OUT OF SCHOOL & OFF TRACK: THE OVERUSE OF SUSPENSIONS
IN AMERICAN MIDDLE AND HIGH SCHOOLS (2013); SAMANTHA POWNALL, NEW
YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A, B, C, D, STPP: HOW SCHOOL DISCIPLINE FEEDS
THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE (2013); Russell Skiba, Mariella I. Arredondo
& Natasha T. Williams, More Than a Metaphor: The Contribution of
Exclusionary Discipline to a School-to-Prison Pipeline. 47 EQUITY &
EXCELLENCE EDUC. 546 (2014).
37. See, e.g., Ian Urbina, It’s a Fork, It’s a Spoon, It’s a . . . Weapon?, N.Y.
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of the use of suspensions by schools reveal that they are
frequently used for relatively minor acts of student
Additionally, some research suggests that
misbehavior.38
schools that rely heavily on such measures and policies create
environments that are less inclusive for students and are
actually less safe.39
SROs have also been subject to these criticisms. For
example, many SROs may not be sufficiently trained to interact
with school-aged children.40 Their training has traditionally
focused on their law enforcement role, with little training on
counseling, teaching, or interacting with children.41
Scholars have also pointed out that SROs’ law enforcement
and counselor roles can often conflict, as they may attempt to
mentor students and then have to arrest the same students,
thereby destroying any trust they had built.42 In this respect,
their dual roles as law enforcement officers and school
administrators creates confusion. Even when these roles are not
in direct conflict, the presence of SROs in schools can lead to an
increase in student arrests, thereby feeding the pipeline.43
Just as suspensions have frequently been used by schools as
disciplinary responses to relatively minor misbehavior, arrests
of students by SROs (and other police officers called to schools)
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/12/education/12dis
cipline.html.
38. See, e.g., KUPCHIK, supra note 9, at 44-45.
39. See Charles Crawford & Ronald Burns, Reducing School Violence:
Considering School Characteristics and the Impacts of Law Enforcement,
School Security, and Environmental Factors, 39 INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES &
MGMT. 455 (2016); Irwin A. Hyman & Donna C. Perone, The Other Side of
School Violence: Educator Policies and Practices That May Contribute to
Student Misbehavior, 36 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 7 (1998); Jason P. Nance, School
Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 79, 104-06
[hereinafter School Surveillance]; ACLU & ACLU OF CONN., HARD LESSONS:
SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAMS AND SCHOOL-BASED ARRESTS IN THREE
CONNECTICUT TOWNS (2008).
40. See Kathy E. Martinez-Prather, Joseph M. McKenna & Scott W.
Bowman, The Impact of Training on Discipline Outcomes in School-Based
Policing, 39 INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 478 (2016); Jason P. Nance,
Rethinking Law Enforcement in Schools, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 151
(2016) [hereinafter Rethinking Law Enforcement]; Keierleber, supra note 5.
41. See, e.g., TEXAS APPLESEED, SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: TICKETING,
ARREST, AND USE OF FORCE IN SCHOOLS 12 (2010); Keierleber, supra note 5.
42. See KUPCHIK, supra note 9.
43. See Nance, supra note 34.
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overwhelmingly arise out of minor misbehavior, such as
disorderly conduct and misdemeanor assault charges.44 There
have also been reports of abusive behavior by SROs against
students, including acts of violence.45 For example, several news
reports have featured videos of SROs’ violent treatment of
students.46 The New York Civil Liberties Union and American
Civil Liberties Union documented a wide variety of abuses by
school resource officers in New York City, including derogatory,
abusive, and discriminatory comments, inappropriate sexual
attention, and physical abuse.47
Despite these criticisms, SROs remain a common fixture in
many American public schools. For example, the mass shooting
at Sandy Hook Elementary in Connecticut led to renewed calls
for the increased use of SROs in schools.48 In the schools in
which they are stationed, they will continue to have frequent
contact with students, including being a primary response when
students misbehave. Accordingly, it is essential to understand
the civil rights remedies available to students.

44. See Chongmin Na & Denise C. Gottfredson, Police Officers in Schools:
Effects on School Crime and the Processing of Offending Behaviors, 30 JUST. Q.
619 (2013); Nance, supra note 35; Wolf, supra note 21.
45. See, e.g., Dana Ford, Greg Batelho & Kevin Conlon, Spring Valley
High School Officer Suspended After Violent Classroom Arrest, CNN (Oct. 27,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/27/us/south-carolina-school-arrest-video/.
46. See, e.g., Sarah Aarthun & Holly Yan, Student’s Violent Arrest Caught
on Video; Officer Under Investigation, CNN (Oct. 27, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/26/us/south-carolina-spring-valley-high-schoolstudent-video/index.html; Sam Levin, Girl Body-slammed by North Carolina
Officer was Stopping a Fight, Students Say, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/04/high-school-girl-bodyslammed-police-officer-north-carolina; Avianne Tan, 2 Baltimore School Police
Officers Charged in Assault of Student Caught on Video, ABC NEWS (Mar. 9,
2016),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/baltimore-school-police-officers-chargedassault-student-caught/story?id=37518067.
47. ELORA MUKHERJEE & MARVIN M. KARPATKIN, NEW YORK CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION & ACLU, CRIMINALIZING THE CLASSROOM: THE OVER-POLICING
OF NEW YORK CITY SCHOOLS (2007).
48. Donna St. George & Ovetta Wiggins, Schools Taking Serious Look at
Putting Armed Police in Schools After Massacre, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/schools-taking-serious-lookat-putting-armed-police-in-schools-after-massacre/2013/02/07/f2fcc9ec-6e1111e2-ac36-3d8d9dcaa2e2_story.html.
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III. Students’ Diminished Rights in School
Before specifically considering the potential for civil rights
claims against SROs, the diminished rights of American publicschool students must first be explored. Students’ rights against
search and seizure, Miranda rights, and free speech rights are
all limited in the school environment. Additionally, the strict
discipline codes and heightened security measures that are
commonplace in America’s schools further limit students’ rights.
A. Searches
The right against unreasonable searches by government
officials springs from the Fourth (and by extension, the
Fourteenth) Amendment. The standard for when a student can
be searched by a school official is less stringent than the
probable cause standard that applies to searches by the police in
most contexts.49 School personnel are only required to have a
reasonable suspicion that a student has violated the law or a
school rule. Citing the need for schools to maintain order, the
Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. held that requiring
school officials to have probable cause to search a student would
be unreasonable.50 Instead, the Court set forth a two-part test:
whether the search was justified at its inception and whether
the search “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place.”51 This
standard is more relaxed in two ways: first, the amount of

49. In order for a police officer to conduct a search of a person she
encounters on the street, she must generally have probable cause, the standard
required to obtain a warrant. However, there are some exceptions to this. If
the officer’s search is merely a “stop and frisk”, she must only have reasonable
suspicion that the search will produce evidence of a crime or contraband, such
as illicit drugs or weapons. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). During such
a stop, in order to perform a search that goes beyond a pat down, such as
reaching into pockets or clothes or opening bags, the officer must have probable
cause (which sometimes is obtained from evidence gathered during the pat
down). Id. at 19. Probable cause is also not required when “exigent
circumstances” require the search and when police are conducting certain
routinized searches. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
50. See generally 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
51. Id. at 341.
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evidence that is required is less;52 and second, school officials can
suspect the student of violating the law or a school rule,53 which
can include a much wider swath of behavior, such as possessing
cell phones and other items considered contraband in school, but
are permissible elsewhere.
Following T.L.O., the Court expanded the ability of schools
to search students, even when individualized suspicion is not
present. First, in Vernonia School District v. Acton, the Court
held that random drug testing of students participating in
athletics was permissible, based in part on evidence that student
drug abuse was a problem in the school.54 The Court emphasized
that the school’s effort to deter and detect drug use both
protected students from drug’s ill effects and prevented
disruption of the educational process.55 Then, in Board of
Education v. Earls, the Court upheld a school’s random drug
testing regime that applied to all participants in extracurricular
activities.56 The school offered no proof of a drug problem in the
school, but instead contended that it was attempting to curb
student drug use generally.57
General, suspicionless searches of students beyond the drug
testing programs that were at issue in Acton and Earls are also
commonplace, with little restrictions on their use. For example,
during the 2013-2014 school year, close to one quarter of all
public schools58 in the United States reported the use of drug
52. Id. at 341 (“We join the majority of courts that have examined this
issue in concluding that the accommodation of the privacy interests of
schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for
freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to
the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the
subject of the search has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of
a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all
the circumstances, of the search.”).
53. Id. at 341-42 (“Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student
by a teacher or other school official will be ‘justified at its inception’ when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence
that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the
school.” [emphasis added]).
54. See 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
55. Id. at 661-62.
56. See 536 US 822 (2002).
57. Id. at 835-36.
58. This includes elementary, middle and high schools. Presumably, the
use of drug sniffing dogs is concentrated in middle and high schools.

13

WOLF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

228

5/8/18 10:20 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38.2

sniffing dogs.59 Courts have frequently permitted schools to
stage unannounced searches with drug sniffing dogs and then
search students’ personal effects if the dog signals that drugs
may be present. Generally, students do not have an expectation
of privacy when they are in school, beyond their personal effects.
As such, courts do not view dog sniffing of exteriors of lockers,
cars, and other objects in the school as searches requiring any
level of suspicion.60 Then, if a drug sniffing dog signals that an
object may contain contraband, the signal provides sufficient
evidence for a search, regardless of whether the reasonable
suspicion or probable cause standard applies.61 Schools perform
general, suspicionless searches of students in other ways as well,
including the use of metal detectors and bag searches as
students enter school, and random sweeps for contraband.62
Recently, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of numerous students
who were subject to a mass, suspicionless search of their persons
by police officers during a four-hour lockdown at their school.
The officers were searching for illegal drugs. They were most
concerned about thirteen students at the school, but decided to
search all students.63

59. Digest of Educational Statistics, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., tbl.
233.50, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_233.50.asp.
60. See, e.g., In re Dengg, 724 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999)
(“[T]he use of a drug sniffing dog to detect the presence of contraband, by
sniffing the exterior of an object, is not a ‘search’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.”); Rudolph ex rel. Williams v. Lowndes Cty. Bd. of Educ.,
242 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1120 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (“Clearly, the activity of the drugsniffing dog walking up and down the aisles sniffing for contraband is not a
Fourth Amendment search.”).
61. See, e.g., Marner v. Eufaula City Sch. Bd., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (M.D.
Ala. 2002) (holding that once drug sniffing dog signaled that a car contained
contraband, a search was permitted without a warrant); Dengg, 724 N.E.2d at
1260 (dog alerted to student’s car during a school–side sweep constituted
probable cause for police officers conducting the search). See also Feld, supra
note 8, at 905-11.
62. Digest of Educational Statistics, supra note 59 (finding that
approximately 11 percent of schools perform random sweeps for contraband
and approximately 2 percent use metal detectors).
63. Jacey Fortin, ‘How Far Can They Go?’ Police Search of Hundreds of
Students Stokes Lawsuit and Constitutional Questions, N.Y. TIMES (June 13,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/us/georgia-police-patdown-studen
ts.html.
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In Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, the Court
identified some limits on schools’ ability to search students.64
This case arose out of a strip search of a female high school
student.65 The school administrator who directed the search was
investigating a report of drugs being distributed in school.66 The
strip-searched student was known to associate with a delinquent
group of students and her planner was found containing
contraband while in the possession of another student.67 After
the contraband was discovered, the student was questioned and
her backpack was searched yielding no additional drugs or other
contraband.68 A school administrator then ordered a strip
search, which also did not produce any contraband.69 The Court
held that the search of the backpack was reasonable, but the
strip search went too far.70 The Court identified strip searches
as particularly intrusive, requiring individualized suspicion that
contraband was being concealed on the student’s person.71 Thus,
while this search was reasonable at its inception, the scope of
the search was excessive.
While Redding identified some limits of schools’ ability to
search students, the reasonable suspicion standard has
permitted invasive searches of students to occur based on
relatively benign behavior. For example, a search of student’s
backpack was deemed permissible based only on student’s
proximity to a fire that had been set in the school and the
student pulling his hood up to cover part of his face after
encountering a teacher.72 A search of a student’s car by a school
security officer similarly did not violate the Fourth Amendment
when the student was seen going to his car without a proper pass
and when students smoking in the parking lot was an ongoing
problem at the school.73 Thus, the standard for searching a
64. See 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 368.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 368-69.
69. Id. at 369.
70. Safford Unified Sch. Dist., 557 U.S. at 375-77.
71. Id. at 376-77.
72. Vassallo v. Lando, 591 F. Supp. 2d 172, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
73. Anders v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 124 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624 (N.D.
Ind. 2000).
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student is quite low, and can be triggered by suspicions of a wide
array of suspected misbehavior, whether it be illegal or in
violation of school rules.
B. Searches by SROs
The presence of school resource officers in schools presents
two intriguing constitutional questions relating to searches.
First, when working in concert with school resource officers to
investigate alleged student misconduct, are school officials
beholden to the reasonable suspicion or probable cause
standard? Second, do SROs, who fill both law enforcement and
educational roles in their schools, need probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to conduct a constitutionally permissible
search of a student in school? Notably, the Supreme Court in
T.L.O. expressly avoided deciding these questions: “This case
does not present the question of the appropriate standard for
assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in
conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies,
and we express no opinion on that question.”74
Courts have held that school administrators must have
probable cause to conduct a search of a student when the search
is done at the direction or request of a police officer because the
administrator is an agent of law enforcement under these
circumstances.75 However, this analysis quickly becomes murky
when the relationship between the school official and police
officer is not as clear cut. For example, in State v. Heirtzler, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court confirmed a trial court’s finding
that school administrators were agents of law enforcement when
they investigated student drug offenses because the school
resource officer had “delegated the responsibility of
investigating less serious, potential criminal matters – drug
74. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985). The Court has
not addressed this issue subsequently. See also Jacqueline A. Stefkovich &
Judith A. Miller, Law Enforcement Officers in Public Schools: Student Citizens
in Safe Havens?, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 25 (1999) (discussing the standards
that apply to searches performed by police officers in schools in the wake of
T.L.O.).
75. Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the Courtroom: Reassessing
Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School Searches Involving Law
Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067, 1089-90 (2003).
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cases – to school officials.”76 In the school in question, the school
resource officer had an agreement with school officials that he
would handle larger scale investigations and the school officials
would handle investigations of the less serious offenses.
Courts are divided regarding the question of whether school
resource officers need probable cause or reasonable suspicion to
conduct a search of a student on school grounds.77 For example,
in People v. Dilworth, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that
an SRO needed only reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of
a student because the search was conducted in furtherance of
preserving order in the school, not as a law enforcement
function.78 Similarly, the Pennsylvania Superior Court and a
Florida Court of Appeals ruled that SROs only needed
reasonable suspicion to conduct a search on school grounds
because they are school officials, not law enforcement agents.79
Conversely, in State v. Tywayne H., where a gun was found on a
student by an SRO at a school dance, the Court of Appeals of
New Mexico determined that probable cause was required for a
valid search of the student because the officer was a law
enforcement agent.80 New Mexico seems to be in the minority,
however. The Tennessee Supreme Court summarized the
various jurisdictions’ stances on school resource officer searches
as follows:
The majority of jurisdictions which have faced the
issue of what standard to apply to SROs or law
enforcement officers assigned to schools have
applied the reasonable suspicion standard. . . . In
contrast, where law enforcement officers, not
associated with the school system, initiate a
search, or where school officials act at the behest
of law enforcement agencies, the probable cause

76. 789 A.2d 634, 640 (N.H. 2001).
77. See Price, supra note 10; Beger, supra note 8.
78. 661 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. 1996).
79. T.S. v. State, 863 N.E.2d 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Commonwealth v.
J.B., 719 A.2d 1058 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); State v. D.S., 685 So. 2d 41 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
80. 933 P.2d 251 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
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standard is generally applied.81
On this basis, the Court determined that in Tennessee:
[T]he reasonable suspicion standard is the
appropriate standard to apply to searches
conducted by a law enforcement officer assigned
to a school on a regular basis and assigned duties
at the school beyond those of a[n] ordinary law
enforcement officer such that he or she may be
considered a school official as well as a law
enforcement officer, whether labeled an “SRO” or
not. However, if a law enforcement officer not
associated with the school system searches a
student in a school setting, that officer should be
held to the probable cause standard.82
Thus, as the R.D.S. decision indicates, in most states
probable cause is only required for searches of students by police
officers when the investigation is strictly a law enforcement
action. With SROs increasingly present at schools, most
searches conducted by them and school officials need only be
prompted by reasonable suspicion because the SROs can readily
claim their searches arose out of their school official role. Most
relevant to potential Section 1983 claims against SROs for
unconstitutional searches, the shifting roles of SROs – between
police officer and school official – render the level of suspicion
needed for a search unclear in many situations.
Even if the probable cause standard is applied to SROs,
school officials and SROs can easily circumvent it by choosing to
have a school official search the student, as long as it is not
clearly done at the SRO’s behest. Bracy found this to be a
strategy employed in the schools she observed during her
ethnographic observations of SROs.83 Bracy noted that SROs
and administrators were sometimes purposeful in their efforts

81. R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 367-68 (Tenn. 2008).
82. Id. at 369.
83. Nicole L. Bracy, Circumventing the Law: Students’ Rights in Schools
with Police, 26 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 294 (2010).
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to ensure that the lesser reasonable suspicion standard applied
to their searches of students by ensuring that the search was
conducted by a school official.84
C. Interrogations in School
Students’ Miranda rights are also somewhat limited in the
school context. Courts have consistently held that students are
not in custody when being questioned by school administrators
because, as in search situations, school officials are not law
enforcement agents.85 Therefore, students need not be read the
Miranda warning. This is the case even when the administrator
plans to turn evidence gathered during the questioning over to
the police.86
For example, in State v. Barrett, a Louisiana appellate court
found that a Miranda warning was not required when a student
was questioned by a school administrator following a police-led
search of a classroom with drug-sniffing dogs.87 The dogs
focused on the student’s wallet in which a large amount of cash
was found.88 Then, a beeper was found in his backpack.89 The
school administrator asked the student why he had so much
money and the student admitted to drug dealing.90 The court in
Barrett opined that even though the police and administrator
were working together to conduct the drug sweep, at the time of
the questioning the student “had not been taken into custody,
detained, or deprived of his freedom of action, other than as
appropriate considering his status as a student at school.”91
Similarly, in In the matter of V.P., a Texas court held that a
school official was not required to provide a Miranda warning
nor stop questioning a student even after he asked for a lawyer.92
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., State v. Tinkham, 719 A.2d 580 (N.H. 1998); State v.
Biancamano, 666 A.2d 199 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); See generally
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
86. See, e.g., Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 580.
87. State v. Barrett, 683 So.2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
88. Id. at 334.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 339.
92. In re V.P., 55 S.W.3d 25, 31 (Tex. App. 2001).
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Another student had reported to a school resource officer that
V.P. had brought a gun to school.93 Upon hearing this
information, the school resource officer and a hall monitor
removed V.P. from his class, asked him about the gun, and then
frisked him.94 Then, the officer brought V.P. to an assistant
principal’s office.95 The school resource officer left the room and
the assistant principal and hall monitor questioned V.P. about
the gun.96 During the questioning, V.P. asked for a lawyer and
his mother, but the questioning continued.97 He eventually
confessed to having the gun.98 Following the confession, the
school resource officer retrieved the gun, arrested V.P., and read
him the Miranda warning.99 In explaining why V.P’s confession
to the vice principal was admissible, the court stated:
Even assuming appellant was in custody as he
walked with [the S.R.O.] from his classroom to
[the vice principal]’s office, once [the S.R.O.] left
the office, V.P. was no longer in custody as [the
vice principal] questioned him about the gun. [The
vice principal] questioned V.P. about the gun
primarily because he was concerned about the
safety of the other students and faculty. Until the
gun was located and the matter turned over to
[the S.R.O.], [the vice principal] was conducting a
school
investigation,
not
a
criminal
investigation. . . .
That [the vice principal]
questioned appellant on the basis of a tip from
[the S.R.O.] did not transform the questioning into
custodial interrogation, and we have not found
any case law indicating that a student has the
constitutional right to remain silent or to consult
with a lawyer in the face of questioning by a school
principal. Because V.P. was not in official custody
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re V.P., 55 S.W.3d at 28.
Id.
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when questioned, he did not have the legal right
to remain silent or to speak to his lawyer.100
Thus, even when an SRO is directly involved in the investigation
into student misconduct, a Miranda warning is often not
required if a school administrator performs the task of
questioning the student.
When SROs question students in school about alleged
criminal conduct, courts have often, but not always, concluded
that a Miranda warning was required. For example, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a Miranda warning was
required when school resource officers conduct custodial
interrogations in school.101 A Court of Appeals of Texas similarly
held that a Miranda warning was required when as student was
questioned by a school resource officer with his office door
closed.102 The court noted that the officer had probable cause to
make an arrest at the time of the questioning (at least fifteen
students had reported that the student had a gun) and the
circumstances of the questioning would not have led the student
to believe he was free to leave.103
However, some courts have found that students are not in
custody when questioned by SROs because school is not a
threatening environment, like a police station, where coercion is
likely to occur.104 For example, in In re Marquita M., the
Appellate Court of Illinois held that a student who was
questioned by an SRO in a school administrator’s office was not
in custody, pointing to the lack of badgering questions, the
relatively short duration of questions, and the school
environment.105
Similarly, in State v. C.D., the Indiana
Appellate Court determined that a student was not in custody
when he was questioned by a school administrator and an SRO

100. Id. at 33.
101. In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331 (Pa. 2002).
102. In re D.A.R., 73 S.W.3d 505 (Tex. App. 2002).
103. Id. at 510.
104. See, e.g., In re Erik E., No. 1 CA-JV 08-0024, 2008 WL 4216544 (Ariz.
Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2008); In re J.H., 928 A.2d 643 (D.C. 2007); In re Welfare of
B.M.K., No. A07-0852, 2008 WL 1972488 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
105. 970 N.E.2d 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
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about being under the influence of drugs.106 The court reasoned
that the questioning was done for educational purposes, and not
as part of a criminal justice investigation (even though the
student’s admissions led to eventual delinquency charges).107
While some courts have found that Miranda warnings are
required when SROs question students about illegal conduct at
school, some have concluded otherwise. Just like the law
regarding searches of students conducted by SROs, this area of
law is unsettled and therefore does not provide clear guidance to
SROs in their interactions with students.
D. Other Limitations on Students’ Constitutional Rights
The limits on students’ rights are not limited to searches
and seizures, and interrogations. For example, even though
students have some rights to free speech in school, the
limitations on student speech are relatively stringent.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Community Independent School
District,108 the Supreme Court declared that students have free
speech rights in school. In that case, the Court confirmed two
students’ right to wear black arm bands to protest the Vietnam
War, but noted that student speech could be limited if it caused
substantial disruption to the school environment.109 While this
decision seemed to bestow a wide array of rights on students,
subsequent Supreme Court decisions that considered student
free speech rights eroded those rights considerably.
For example, in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the
Court stated that a school did not violate a student’s free speech
rights when it sanctioned him for giving a profane speech during
an assembly related to student elections.110 The Court cited a
school’s interest in teaching values as the rationale for limiting
student speech.111 In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,
the Court confirmed a school’s censorship of a student
newspaper, reasoning that the newspaper was a school
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/1

947 N.E.2d 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Id. at 1022-23.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id.
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Id.

22

WOLF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS AGAINST SROs

5/8/18 10:20 PM

237

sponsored tool of pedagogy and, therefore, the school could
exercise editorial control over its content.112 Then, in Morse v.
Frederick, the Court ruled that a free speech violation had not
occurred when a school suspended a student for declining to
follow a directive to take down a “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” banner
during an extracurricular event, reasoning that speech that
encouraged drug use could be censored by schools because it was
contrary to existing anti-drug policies at the school.113 What
emerges from these cases are free speech protections for
students that fall far below those enjoyed outside of the school
context. The Court relies on the “special circumstances” of the
school to place significant limits on speech. For example, the
speech in Tinker was allowed because it was political and nondisruptive. In the subsequent cases, the Court confirmed that
schools may limit speech that threatens to disrupt the school
environment or that interferes with the pedagogical mission of
the schools, such as teaching values or proper behavior.
Thus, students’ free speech rights are significantly
diminished in schools. Erwin Chemerinsky characterized this
line of Supreme Court decisions as “part of a larger failure on
the part of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution when it
comes to schools.”114 While actions by SROs are unlikely to
infringe on students’ free speech rights, the limitations on those
rights further demonstrate the restricted rights environment of
American public schools.
E. Other Restrictions on Students’ Privacy and Freedoms
The increasingly strict, broad, and sometimes vague codes
of student conduct that have become more common in schools
over the past twenty-five years115 further diminish students’
privacy and freedoms. As mentioned above, student searches by

112. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
113. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
114. Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 124.
115. See, e.g., CATHERINE Y. KIM, DANIEL J. LOSEN & DAMON T. HEWITT,
THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 79-80 (2010);
Kerrin Wolf, Mary Kate Kalinich & Susan DeJarnatt, Charting School
Discipline, 48 URB. LAW. 1 (2016) (detailing strict and vague codes of conduct
in charter schools); KUPCHIK, supra note 9.
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school administrators and SROs can be predicated on suspected
violations of school rules. So, when school rules restrict the use
and possession of cell phones and other devices, and make broad
restrictions on “disorderly” behavior, they provide broad
authority for schools to search students. When schools rely on
SROs to conduct these searches, they create adversarial
encounters between SROs and students that can quickly
escalate and lead to criminal charges against students. Some of
the cases discussed below demonstrate how a relatively benign
violation of a school rule can quickly escalate when SROs become
involved, and lead to student arrests and civil rights claims
against SROs.116
Heightened security measures further limit students’ rights
in school. For example, the widespread use of security cameras
in schools inhibits students’ privacy throughout the day.
Likewise, the use of drug-sniffing dogs and random locker
searches further comprise student privacy.117 Some schools also
feature metal detectors that aid schools’ efforts to search
students for contraband as they enter school each day.118 Thus,
in many ways, American public school students have
significantly curtailed rights when they are in school and, as the
cases below demonstrate, these diminished rights are in full
display in their interactions with SROs, leaving them with little
recourse when their rights seem to have been violated by an
SRO.

116. See infra Part III.C.
117. For a discussion of students’ privacy interests when confronted with
drug-sniffing dogs, see, e.g., Todd Feinberg, Suspicionless Canine Sniffs: Does
the Fourth Amendment Prohibit Public Schools from Using Dogs to Search
Without Individualized Suspicion?, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 271 (2007).
See also infra Part III.A.
118. See, e.g., NOLAN, supra note 19.
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IV. Establishing Civil Rights Claims Against School Resource
Officers
Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action against public
officials who violate a person’s civil rights.119 Plaintiffs who
assert these claims must meet a high bar to succeed – they must
both establish that one of their rights was violated and that the
law in place at the time clearly established that the public
official’s actions violated a constitutional right. In Saucier v.
Katz, the Supreme Court established this two-part test for
analyzing civil rights claims: “[T]he first inquiry must be
whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the
facts alleged; second, assuming the violation is established,” the
court must address “whether the right was clearly
established . . . on a . . . specific level” at the time of the official’s
actions.120
The Supreme Court modified the Saucier two-part test
slightly in Pearson v. Callahan, holding that the two-step
analysis must not be strictly adhered to in every case.121
Specifically, it allowed courts to first answer the question of
whether the right that was allegedly violated was clearly
established, thus sometimes avoiding having to make a
determination if a right was in fact violated in the case at hand.
The second part of the test is commonly referred to as
qualified immunity. The justification for this defense rests on
the belief that police officers and public officials should feel free
to take actions that are not in clear violation of the law without
fear of lawsuit. As the Court explained in Harlow v. Fitzgerald:
Where an official could be expected to know that
certain conduct would violate statutory or
constitutional rights, he should be made to
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress”).
120. 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).
121. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).

25

WOLF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

240

5/8/18 10:20 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38.2

hesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused
by such conduct may have a cause of action. But
where an official’s duties legitimately require
action in which clearly established rights are not
implicated, the public interest may be better
served by action taken “with independence and
without fear of consequences.”122
Civil rights claims against SROs most commonly arise out
of the Fourth Amendment violations for unreasonable searches
or unreasonable seizures. The latter may come in the form of an
unlawful/wrongful arrest or through the use of excessive force.
In order to establish whether a constitutional right was clearly
established, courts evaluate whether a reasonable SRO would
have understood that what he was doing violated a
constitutional right.123 Courts look for precedential cases that
feature similar fact patterns and claims. However, plaintiffs do
not have to produce prior case law that matches their claims
exactly; rather, the question is whether the law provides fair and
clear notice that the SROs’ actions violated the law.124 As one
court explained, qualified immunity allows SROs to make
mistakes in judgment, but does not protect “the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”125
Thus, plaintiffs pursuing Section 1983 claims against SROs
(and other public officials) are fighting an uphill battle. Even
when a student’s rights were likely violated, her claim will not
be successful without establishing that a reasonable officer in
the SRO’s position would have known that his actions were a
violation of the law.

122. 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967)).
123. Johnson ex. rel. Smith v. City of Lincoln Park, 434 F. Supp. 2d 467
(E.D. Mich. 2006).
124. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
125. G.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Casalduc, 982 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1241 (D.N.M.
2013) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/1

26

WOLF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS AGAINST SROs

5/8/18 10:20 PM

241

A. Section 1983 Claims Against SROs Arising Out of Alleged
Violations of Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights
Against Unreasonable Searches
As discussed above, courts have frequently, but not
consistently, determined that SROs are beholden to the
reasonable suspicion standard that applies to school officials
when conducting searches of students.
Due to existing
jurisprudence that holds that this lower level of suspicion is all
that is required in many SRO searches of students, it is
relatively easy for an SRO to demonstrate that his actions did
not clearly violate a student’s rights when facing a 1983 claim
arising out of a student search.
For example, in James v. Unified School District No. 512, a
student’s Section 1983 claim against an SRO who took part in
the search of the student’s car was dismissed because the court
found that existing case law was unclear as to whether an SRO
needed reasonable suspicion or probable cause to conduct a
search.126 According to the student’s claims, the only evidence
that supported the need for a search was an anonymous call from
someone claiming to be a parent of a student at the school that
the plaintiff kept a gun in his car.127 While the court determined
that the probable cause standard applied to the SRO’s search in
this circumstance, it nonetheless held that prior case law was
insufficiently clear as to which standard applied to SROs,
thereby supporting the SRO’s qualified immunity defense.128
Similarly, in Thomas v. Roberts, the Eleventh Circuit found
that a mass strip search of fifth graders was unconstitutional,
but qualified immunity protected the SRO and school officials
who conducted the search from Section 1983 liability.129 The
case arose out of an incident in which twenty-six dollars in an
envelope went missing from a teacher’s desk and the students in
her class were suspected of taking it.130 The students were led
to bathrooms and males were searched by the SRO, who was also

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

959 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (D. Kan. 1997).
Id.
Id.
323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 952.
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male, and females were searched by a female teacher.131 The
students were required to pull down their pants and underwear,
and expose their private parts.132 The court concluded that the
search was unconstitutional because the SRO and school
officials lacked individualized suspicion.133 However, prior case
law did not clearly establish this and the constitutional violation
was not so egregious to overcome statutory immunity in light of
the lack of clear precedent.134
In Burlison v. Springfield Public Schools, the Eighth Circuit
dismissed a Section 1983 claim against an SRO and others that
arose out of a suspicionless search of students’ belongings with
a drug sniffing dog.135 The students were forced to leave their
classroom while the dog sniffed their belongings, and the
plaintiff student claimed that his bag had been opened and
searched, though he had no further evidence that this had
occurred.136 In dismissing the claim, the court cited the officer’s
adherence to drug sniffing dog procedures, the existing drug
problem at the school where the search was conducted, and the
minimized rights of students in school against searches.137
Further, the court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that
individualized
suspicion
was
needed
under
these
circumstances.138
The wide array of behaviors that are prohibited by school
codes of conduct also preclude successful Section 1983 claims
against SROs for unreasonable searches. For example, in G.M.
ex rel. B.M. v. Casalduc, a search of a student for a cell phone by
an SRO was deemed justified at its inception because use of a
cell phone by students during teaching time was a violation of
school rules.139 The court applied the reasonableness standard
to the search and found that the student’s alleged violation of
131. Id.
132. Id. (this case was decided before Redding, which likely renders mass
strip searches such as this one are unconstitutional).
133. Id. at 956.
134. Id.
135. 708 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2013).
136. Id. at 1036-37.
137. Id. at 1039-40.
138. Id. at 1040.
139. 982 F. Supp. 2d at 1235; see also infra Part III.C (discussing Johnson
ex rel. Smith v. City of Lincoln Park, 434 F. Supp. 2d 467 (E.D. Mich. 2006)).
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the cell phone policy was enough to justify the search.140
Thus, the high bar set by qualified immunity is seemingly
insurmountable for students seeking compensation under
Section 1983 against SROs for unreasonable searches. First,
cases that grapple with the question of whether SROs are law
enforcement officers, as opposed to school officials, when
searching students are relatively rare. Second, the existing case
law that more frequently applies the reasonable suspicion
standard to SRO searches of students renders the law unclear
enough to support qualified immunity defenses for the SROs in
almost all cases, as all they need is reasonable suspicion to
justify the search.141 Additionally, because SROs are often
viewed as school officials responding to violations of school rules,
the wide array of behavior that is forbidden by school codes of
conduct provides a remarkably wide array of justifications for
searches, even though criminal behavior may not be suspected.
That mass suspicionless searches are also permitted in schools
further protects SROs against such claims.
B. Section 1983 Claims Against SROs Arising Out of Alleged
Violations of Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights
Against Unreasonable Seizures
Students have found greater success in Section 1983 claims
against SROs arising out of their Fourth Amendment rights
against unreasonable seizure. However, claims that survive
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment still only
arise in very limited circumstances.
In Gray v. Bostic, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
found that a SRO violated a fourth-grade student’s Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable seizure when he
handcuffed her after she threatened her gym teacher.142

140. The court also found that the search was justified because it was
incident to arrest. G.M. ex rel. B.M., 982 F. Supp. 2d at 1248.
141. Developments in the Law – Policing: Chapter Two: Policing Students,
128 HARV. L. REV. 1747, 1753 (2015) (“Cases where courts find that a search of
a student required probable cause are rare and usually involve either an
outside police search only tangentially related to the school setting, or an SRO
who has a purely law enforcement role.”).
142. 458 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006).

29

WOLF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

244

5/8/18 10:20 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38.2

Importantly, the threatened coach testified that he did not
actually fear that the young student would harm him.143 The
SRO admitted that he handcuffed her to teach her the potential
severe consequences of her actions.144 The court found that a
Fourth Amendment violation occurred, based on T.L.O.’s twostep analysis, which focuses on whether the search or seizure
was justified at its inception and “reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified interference in the first
place.”145 Since the student committed a misdemeanor when she
threatened her teacher, the seizure was justified at its
inception.146 Here, the court found that the SRO was acting
within his duties as an SRO because detaining students was
something SROs sometimes did when students committed
crimes in school (and threatening bodily harm is a
misdemeanor).147 However, the handcuffing of the student was
not reasonably related in scope because she did not pose a threat,
a fact that was bolstered by the SRO’s admission that the
handcuffing was done only to teach the student a lesson.148 The
court further concluded that the SRO was not entitled to
qualified immunity because the handcuffing was contrary to
clearly established law, stating: “Every reasonable officer would
have known that handcuffing a compliant nine-year-old child for
purely punitive purposes is unreasonable.”149 Notably, there
was not any precedential case law that was factually similar to
this case, but the court nevertheless found that the handcuffing
was clearly outside the bounds of legality.150
In Jordan v. Blackwell, a Section 1983 claim was brought
against an SRO who physically restrained a thirteen-year-old
female student in order to extricate her from a fight in which she
was the aggressor and transport her to the principal’s office.151
The SRO took hold of the student’s arms, allegedly in a

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/1

Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1301.
Id. at 1304.
Id.
Id. at 1295.
Gray, 458 F.3d at 1306.
Id. at 1307.
Id.
No. 5:06-cv-214, 2008 WL 4449576, at *1 (M.D. Ga. 2008).
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chokehold, and broke her shoulder.152 The United States
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia found that an
issue of fact remained regarding whether the SRO’s use of force
violated the student’s Fourth Amendment rights.153 The SRO
and student offered different descriptions of the force that was
used, leading the court to leave the key factual determination in
the hands of the factfinder at trial.154 The court similarly found
that the question of qualified immunity was also dependent on
the resolution of this factual dispute, as the circumstances of the
force that was used would determine whether the SRO
reasonably believed his use of force complied with existing legal
standards.155
Likewise, in Williams v. Morgan, the Sixth Circuit affirmed
a district court’s denial of an SRO’s motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that issues of fact remained regarding
whether the student posed a threat and whether the SRO used
excessive force.156 In Williams, an SRO broke a thirteen-yearold student’s arm when he used an arm hold to restrain her.157
The student had been in a verbal argument with another
student earlier in the day and had torn posters off the walls of
the school after receiving her punishment for the argument (a
five-day suspension).158 Later that day, the SRO confronted the
student about the posters in a stairwell.159 He believed she acted
defiantly “by putting one foot behind her and putting her hands
on her hips,” and proceeded to push her against the wall and
bend her arm behind her back with enough force to break her
arm.160 A video camera recorded a significant part of this
altercation, including a moment when the SRO applied enough
force while holding her arm behind her back to lift the student
off the ground.161 The court also noted that the student’s crimes
(“criminal damaging and disorderly conduct” according to the
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
652 Fed. App’x. 365 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 367.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 367.
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SRO) were not serious enough to warrant an arrest or
prosecution.162 Based on this evidence, the court confirmed that
a jury was the proper arbiter of whether the student’s rights
were violated.163
While these cases reveal certain circumstances in which
Section 1983 claims based on unreasonable seizure can be
successful, other decisions demonstrate that the scope of such
circumstances is quite limited. For example, in Hoskins v.
Cumberland County Board of Education, parents of an eightyear-old second grader alleged that an SRO had violated their
son’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure
when the SRO handcuffed the student for forty-five minutes.164
The handcuffing followed a series of events in which the student
swung his fist in the vicinity of a teacher and threatened to hit
the principal and SRO.165 In order to determine if the student’s
Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the court considered
“the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect pose[d]
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he [wa]s actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.”166 The court determined that the seizure was
unreasonable because of the child’s young age, the relatively
minor nature of his crime, and the fact that he did not pose a
serious threat to anyone.167 The court further reasoned that the
special nature of the school environment that often lessens
students’ civil rights did not apply in this case because the
handcuffing was clearly related to a law enforcement function
(the SRO planned to charge the student with a misdemeanor and
take him to juvenile detention).168 However, the court ultimately
determined that the student’s parents failed to meet their
burden of proving that the SRO was not entitled to qualified
immunity because they failed to demonstrate that the SRO
clearly violated the law.169 The court pointed to the lack of

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/1

Williams, 652 Fed App’x at 374.
Id.
No. 2:13-cv-15, 2014 WL 7238621, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. 2014).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *6 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
Id. at *7.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *13.
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evidence regarding what occurred during the forty-five minute
handcuffing and whether the principal and SRO could have
reasonably feared for their safety.170 Notably, the court pointed
to Bostic (discussed above) as a case in which the plaintiffs
demonstrated that an SRO was not entitled to qualified
immunity when he handcuffed a fourth grader because there
was evidence that the child was sitting quietly while handcuffed
and school staff testified that they were not afraid of the student
at the time.171 This case highlights yet another challenge in
bringing successful Section 1983 claims against SROs –
gathering reliable evidence is often difficult because it often
rests on the testimony of minors.
In Hayenga v. Nampa School District No. 131, an SRO was
alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment rights of an
eleven-year-old developmentally disabled student.172 The SRO
used force to subdue the student when he attempted to leave his
classroom after tapping on his desk and being verbally
aggressive.173 The SRO took the student to the ground,
“hobbled” the student’s legs, and handcuffed the student (with
the help of other officers).174 The student was then transported
to the hospital on a mental hold, but continued to struggle
against his confinement and complained of pain.175 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s granting of the SRO’s motion
for summary judgment, even though it concluded that the SRO
used excessive force in subduing the student (based on the
student’s version of the facts).176 Because there was not prior
case law that “squarely” fit the facts of this case, and the SRO’s
actions “fell into the ‘hazy border between excessive and
acceptable force,’” the SRO was entitled to qualified immunity
according to the court.177
170. Hoskins, No. 2:13-cv-15, 2014 WL 7238621, at *6, 13.
171. Id. at *12.
172. 123 Fed. App’x. 783 (9th Cir. 2005).
173. Id. at 786.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 786. In a more recent, reported decision, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed a trial court’s verdict in favor an 11-year-old elementary school
student with ADHD who asserted similar Section 1983 claims against police
officers (not SROs) who handcuffed him at school. See C.B. v. City of Sonora,
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Likewise, in J.H. ex rel. J.P. v. Bernalillo County, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed a summary judgment in favor of a SRO who
arrested and handcuffed an eleven-year-old female student after
the SRO observed her kicking a teacher in her special needs
classroom.178 While the student’s act of kicking her teacher
clearly constituted a crime and justified her arrest under the
law, whether it was appropriate to handcuff the student is a
closer question, given her age and special needs. Yet, the court
concluded that her young age did not undermine the SRO’s
concern for safety and need to maintain control; therefore, the
use of handcuffs was justified.179
C. The Extraordinary Result: Benign Misbehavior Leading
to Permissible Searches and Seizures
In Johnson v. City of Lincoln Park, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted an
SRO’s motion for summary judgment in a case in which the SRO
twice tased a fourteen-year-old student who had previously been
diagnosed as emotionally impaired.180 The events leading up to
the tasing demonstrate how the involvement of an SRO in
routine school discipline matters can escalate quickly and result
in potentially abusive behavior against students, yet leave those
students without legal recourse.181 Johnson arose from an
occurrence in which a student brought a Gameboy into school, in
clear violation of school rules. When he was brought to the
principal’s office, he repeatedly and loudly refused to surrender
769 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2014). On the day in question, the student had
forgotten to take his medication that helped regulate his symptoms, and was
sitting quietly and unresponsively on the playground at recess. Id. When a
school official directed the student to go inside, the student did not move. Id.
Eventually, the official called the police and the officer that arrived handcuffed
the student, placed him in a police car, and transported him to his uncle’s
business. Id. Notably, the student remained quiet during each encounter, and
complied with all of the officer’s requests. Id. The court held that existing law
clearly established that the seizure of the student was unreasonable under the
circumstances. Id.
178. 806 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2015).
179. Id. at 1258.
180. Johnson ex rel. Smith v. City of Lincoln Park, 434 F. Supp. 2d 467
(E.D. Mich. 2006).
181. Id. at 469.
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the Gameboy.182 The SRO was called in to assist in the situation,
but the student continued to refuse. The SRO then stood the
student up and began to pat the student down in search of the
Gameboy.183 This physical contact agitated the student who
took a swing at the SRO and a struggle ensued; the student bit
the officer three times during the struggle.184 The SRO
eventually handcuffed the student, but the student continued to
thrash in an attempt to prevent the SRO from searching him.185
After a warning, the officer tased the student once through his
clothing and then on his bare skin, leading the student to stop
struggling.186
The student was ultimately charged with assaulting an
officer and with resisting arrest, which seems understandable
given his actions towards the SRO.187 However, that these
events arose out of the student’s possession of a Gameboy and
the SRO’s decision to physically search an emotionally impaired
and noticeably agitated student raises serious concerns.
Additionally, the SRO’s decision to tase the student twice after
handcuffing him also calls the SRO’s actions into question. Yet,
the decision to grant the SRO’s motion for summary judgment
on the student’s Section 1983 claims based on unreasonable
search and seizure was straightforward to the court.188 First,
the search for the Gameboy was justified because the student
was reasonably suspected of breaking a school rule.189 Second,
the student’s argument that he should not be arrested was easily
defeated by the fact that he swung at and bit the SRO.190 Third,
the court found that the SRO did not use excessive force when
he tased the handcuffed student because the student continued
to struggle despite being handcuffed.191 The court further noted
that the student’s injuries – a rug burn and small bruise from

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 470.
Id.
Id.
Johnson, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
Id. at 470-71.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 478-80.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 477-78.
Johnson, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 478-81.
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the taser – suggested that the use of force was not excessive.192
So, a case that started with the possession of a Gameboy by an
emotionally-impaired student ultimately led to his being tased
twice, despite being handcuffed. Yet, the student’s 1983 claim
was far from being viable.
The dismissal of a student’s Section 1983 claims for
unreasonable seizure in G.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Casalduc raised
similar concerns.193 There, a student was arrested by an SRO
and charged with a misdemeanor for “willfully interfering with
the educational process . . . by committing, threatening to
commit, or inciting others to commit any act that would disrupt,
impair, interfere with or obstruct the lawful mission, processes,
procedure or functions of a public . . . school.”194 The arrest
resulted from the student’s possession and use of a cell phone in
school – she had used it to text in class and refused to turn it
over after she was removed from class.195 After warnings from
the SRO, the student continued to refuse to give him her cell
phone and she was handcuffed, searched, and then arrested.196
The student remained calm during the entire series of events.197
While the court recognized that the above statutory language did
not clearly apply to the student’s behavior because it did not
seem like she was intending to disrupt the educational process
at her school, it concluded that the SRO was entitled to qualified
immunity because the language of the statute arguably applied
to her behavior and no prior case law existed to clearly dispute
his interpretation.198 Much like Johnson, the involvement of an
SRO in a routine and benign disciplinary incident quickly
escalated in to an arrested and handcuffed student.
A.M. ex rel. F.M. v. Holmes offers another instance of
childish, relatively benign behavior quickly turning into
criminal charges against the student.199 However, in that case,
the student did little to contribute to the escalation. The
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss2/1

Id. at 478-80.
982 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D.N.M. 2013).
Id. at 1240-43.
Id. at 1240.
Id.
Id.
Id.
830 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2016).
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student’s arrest stemmed from his classroom behavior, which
consisted of him burping and laughing along with his
classmates.200 His teacher removed him from the class to the
hallway, but the student continued to burp into the classroom.201
At this point, the school’s SRO intervened and walked the
student to his office.202 The student complied, waited for the
SRO to retrieve his computer from his car, and then was charged
with “interfering with the educational process.”203 The officer
then walked the student to his patrol car, searched the student,
handcuffed him, and then drove him to a detention center.204
The student’s mother brought a civil rights claim against the
SRO, based on unlawful arrest and excessive force claims.
However, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment order
in the SRO’s favor based on qualified immunity.205 The court
concluded that there was not any clear case law that placed the
student’s disruptive burping outside the scope of the law against
interfering with the educational process. Rather, the court
determined the statute in question was worded broadly and
could have been reasonably interpreted to apply to the student
behavior, as his burping and laughing “stopped the flow of
student educational activities, thereby injecting disorder into
the learning environment . . .”206
Even though this
interpretation of the law could feasibly apply to any small act of
student disruption, such as speaking out of turn or passing notes
in class, the court used it to conclude that qualified immunity
applied in this case.207
In almost every other context, the arrest and handcuffing of
a person who calmly refused to turn over their cell phone would
obviously raise significant civil rights concerns. Likewise,
applying criminal sanctions for burping and laughing seems
unimaginable outside of the school context. However, the
200. Id. at 1129-30.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1130.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. A.M. ex rel. F.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2016).
206. Id. at 1142.
207. Id. at 1169. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (highlighting case law that
suggests the officer should have reasonably known the statute did not apply to
the student’s behavior).
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primacy that legislatures and courts place on maintaining order
in schools allows interactions such as these between SROs and
students to occur. Additionally, because SROs serve in dual law
enforcement/school official roles, they are able to rely on the
broad scope of school rules to justify searching and seizing
students. Likewise, schools’ reliance on SROs to address
challenging incidents of student misbehavior, including minor
issues such as Gameboy possession, cell phone use, and burping,
creates frequent interactions between SROs that can easily
escalate, such that arrests and handcuffs arise out of relatively
benign behavior. As trained police officers, SROs often rely on
justice system responses to student misbehavior, instead of more
therapeutic responses that could resolve misbehavior without
such extreme outcomes. It appears that Section 1983 claims are
of limited utility for students seeking to push back against
criminalized responses to their misbehavior.
D. Important Limitations
There are certain limitations inherent in analyzing the
current state of legal claims based on reported court decisions
(and unreported decisions available on legal databases). First,
they do not include claims that were made, but were resolved
without producing any court opinions, most commonly through
settlement or dismissal. It is safe to assume that most of settled
cases were based on clear violations of students’ civil rights. For
example, a handful of videos have surfaced that document SROs
body slamming, hitting, and dragging students in clear displays
of excessive force that would lead to successful claims.208
Second, these decisions do not include potential Section
1983 claims against SROs that were never made. As Barry Feld
noted, students and their parents may opt against pursuing such
claims for a variety of reasons, including being unaware of the
potential for such claims, the power dynamics between schools,
SROs, and students, and fear of reprisal if the student must
208. See, e.g., Lindsey Bever, School Officer Fired After Video Showed
Him Body-Slamming a 12-Year-Old Girl, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2016/04/11/schoolofficer-fired-after-video-showed-him-body-slamming-a-12-year-old-girl/; Ford,
Botelho & Conlon, supra note 45.
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remain enrolled in the school after filing suit.209
V. Strengthening Students’ Section 1983 Claims
Since the Roberts Court began to re-fortify the qualified
immunity defense, legal scholars have worried that it has
become too formidable and undermines the purpose of Section
1983.210 Some contend that it provides too much protection for
government officials.211
Others worry that its current
configuration, which relieves the courts of having to determine
if a plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated as long as it
determines that the right in question was not clearly
established, may slow the development of constitutional
standards.212
More recently, William Baud argued that the legal
justifications for this defense that the Court has offered are all
faulty.213 For example, the Court has commonly suggested that
qualified immunity is supported by the traditional “good faith”
defense that protected government actors from tort liability if
they were acting in good faith that they were following
established law (such as making an arrest when they mistakenly
believed they had probable cause to make the arrest).214 Baud
notes that the Court initially rejected this defense when
considering a Section 1983 claim.215 He then goes on to detail
how, despite this initial rejection, this defense was retroactively
used (and then expanded) to support the qualified immunity
defense against Section 1983 claims.216 Baud proceeds to
209. Feld, supra note 8.
210. See, e.g., William Baud, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL.
L. REV. 45 (2018); Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional
Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 139, 141; Karen Blum et. al., Qualified
Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV.
633 (2013).
211. Baud, supra note 210, at 46-47 (citing Devon W. Carbado, Blue-onBlack Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479,
1522-24 (2016)).
212. Id. at 47 (citing Aaron Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New
Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2015)).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 53.
215. Id. at 57-58.
216. Id. at 59-61.
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critique other justifications for qualified immunity found in
Supreme Court opinions, concluding:
The Court’s crusade to enforce the doctrine of
qualified immunity does not serve congressional
intent or the rule of law. . . . If qualified immunity
leads to bad consequences, it can be fixed . . . . [I]t
can be overruled. And even if it the Court does not
overrule it, it can stop expanding the legal
error.217
The current prominence of citizens’ violent encounters with the
police suggest that the qualified immunity defense may be ripe
for serious reconsideration.218 The cases detailed here add
further support to this notion, as several illustrate how the
doctrine has shielded SROs from liability for seemingly
egregious behavior.
Beyond the potential reform of qualified immunity, which
may be unrealistic given the Court’s consistent support of it,
reforms in the way SROs are permitted to operate could also
strengthen students’ ability to bring successful Section 1983
claims against SROs and fortify their rights in schools.
The unique role of SROs and the diminished rights of
students in schools limit students’ abilities to bring successful
civil rights claims against SROs to only the most egregious of
cases. Specifically, the minimal protections students have
against being searched seems to have made Section 1983 claims
against SROs for unreasonable searches nonviable. Conversely,
students’ youth (and their diminished physical prowess) do not
seem to restrict SRO’s ability to use force when arresting
students for even the most minor misbehavior. The only
situations found in court opinions that suggest that
unreasonable force may have been used by SROs involved a
docile fourth grader who was handcuffed to “teach her a lesson”
and students who suffered broken bones while being restrained
by SROs. Qualified immunity proves to be a strong defense for
217. Id. at 88.
218. The current make-up of the Court is unlikely to pull back its breadth,
however.
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SROs, largely because existing case law is inconsistent and
favorable to SROs’ ability to search students based on minimal
information and use force against students even if they
seemingly do not pose a real threat.
Therefore, the most effective way to strengthen students’
ability to bring successful Section 1983 claims against the
oppressive actions of SROs is through state or federal legislation
governing the actions of SROs. Legislation that provides clear
guidelines for SROs’ interactions with the students they serve is
the most evident way to protect students against invasive and
aggressive actions by SROs. The clarity of these guidelines will
also give meaningful power to Section 1983 claims by students
because they will undermine SROs’ qualified immunity
defenses. Many states have already passed legislation relating
to SROs, so legislation on a state level is a possibility.219
Likewise, because federal funding provides millions of dollars to
support many SRO programs throughout the country, the
federal government can link this funding to limits on SROs’ roles
in schools.220 Notably, the Department of Education already has
provided recommendations for the use of SROs in schools,221 but
binding guidelines that are attached to funding for SROs provide
much clearer standards for SRO behavior.
Three provisions should be the centerpieces of such
legislation: (1) clear delineation of SROs as law enforcement
officials in all interactions with students; (2) limits on when
SROs may use physical force against students, including when
they may handcuff students; and (3) requirements for SRO
training focused on their interactions with students that caters
219. THE COUNCIL FOR STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., Officers in Schools: A
Snapshot of Legislative Action (2014), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/NCSL-School-Police-Brief.pdf.
220. See Nance, supra note 34, at 947 (detailing the significant costs of
SROs and the hundreds of millions of dollars spent by the federal government).
221. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDING PRINCIPLES: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR
IMPROVING SCHOOL CLIMATE AND DISCIPLINE (2014), https://www2.ed.gov/
policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/guiding-principles.pdf (stating, among other
recommendations, “To ensure the proper functioning of any school-based law
enforcement program and to avoid negative unintended consequences, schools
should provide clear definitions of the officers’ roles and responsibilities on
campus, written documentation of those roles, proper training, and continuous
monitoring of the program’s activities through regular data collection and
evaluation.”).
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to the social, emotional, and intellectual realities of the student
populations that SROs serve.
Delineating SROs as law enforcement officials in all
interactions with students would clarify searches and
interrogations of student when SROs are involved.222 In the
realm of searches, SROs’ clear status as law enforcement
officials would render probable cause (of criminal conduct) the
standard. The reasonable suspicion standard that applies to
school officials would not apply in certain situations, as it does
now. Additionally, suspected violations of school codes of
conduct would also be insufficient justification for searches that
involve SROs. Likewise, Miranda warnings would always be
required when SROs are involved in questioning students
(assuming that the students are deemed “in custody” at the time
of questioning). Importantly, legislation considering this rule
should also include guards against collusion by school officials
and SROs in searches and interrogations so that SROs cannot
defer these tasks to school officials, who are beholden to different
rules.
Along with this delineation, SROs should also be removed
from schools’ disciplinary responses to minor misbehavior.223
While SROs may have the training and ability to stop a fight
that is in progress and deal with threats to safety in the school,
such as weapons on campus, they do not need to be involved in
common student misbehavior. Even the disciplinary responses
to schoolyard fights can be handled by school administrators
instead of by SROs.224

222. Price, supra note 10, at 567-569 (arguing that a bright-line rule that
SROs always be considered police officers in their interactions with students
would provide clarity and protect students’ rights); see also CATHERINE Y. KIM
& I. INDIA GERANIMO, ACLU, POLICING IN SCHOOLS: DEVELOPING A GOVERNANCE
DOCUMENT FOR SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS IN K-12 SCHOOLS 8-13 (2009).
223. This solution was also suggested by the ACLU in a white paper on
developing governance documents on SROs roles in schools. See KIM &
GERANIMO, supra note 222.
224. See, e.g., Aaron M. Thompson & Michelle E. Alvarez, Considerations
for Integrating School Resource Officers into School Mental Health Models, 35
CHILD. & SCHS. 131, 134 (2013) (“Developing a stepwise discipline system and
criteria for what constitutes a school discipline issue, an arrest, and what
events should always be subjected to review may alleviate confusion and
protect student rights.”).
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Placing restrictions of the use of force by SROs would
provide clarity to interactions between SROs and students who
are under arrest or who SROs otherwise desire to physically
control. A legal standard that restricts the use of force, including
restraints, to only situations in which the student poses a danger
or is an identifiable flight risk would curtail the use of handcuffs
in many situations.
Some precedent for such policy exists. Many states have
begun to limit the use of handcuffs on juveniles in other
situations. For example, in several states, courts and legislators
have considered limitations of when juveniles can be handcuffed
and shackled when they face delinquency charges. Delaware
recently passed a law forbidding the shackling of juveniles facing
delinquency charges in the state’s family court, unless the court
makes a finding that shackling is necessary.225 Other states have
arrived at this policy through court decisions.226 A similar
standard could be applied to SROs in their interactions with
students – handcuffs and other restraints should only be used
when the officer determines the student is a threat or a flight
risk, even when the student is under arrest.
Finally, legislation that requires thorough training of SROs
that would provide specific guidance to SROs in their
interactions with students could help protect students’ rights.227
Catering training to the social, emotional, and intellectual
225. Juvenile Justice Reform Bills Signed into Law, DEL. HOUSE
DEMOCRATS
(2016),
http://www.dehousedems.com/press/juvenile-justicereform-bills-signed-law; see also Anne Teigen, States that Limit or Prohibit
Juvenile Shackling and Solitary Confinement, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/states-that-limit-or-prohibit-juvenile-shackling-and-solitaryconfinement635572628.aspx.
226. Teigen, supra note 225.
227. See, e.g., George W. Timberlake, Cops in Schools Need Special
Training About Children and Trauma, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Nov. 5,
2015), http://jjie.org/2015/11/05/cops-in-schools-need-special-training-aboutchildren-and-trauma/; BARBARA RAYMOND, CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS.
OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE RESPONSE
GUIDES SERIES NO. 10, ASSIGNING POLICE OFFICERS TO SCHOOLS 23-24 (2010),
http://www.popcenter.org/Responses/pdfs/school_police.pdf;
Matthew
T.
Theriot & Matthew J. Cuellar, School Resource Officers and Students’ Rights,
19 CONTEMP. J. REV. 363, 374 (2016); Lisa H. Thurau & Jonathon Wald,
Controlling Partners: When Law Enforcement Meets Discipline in Public
Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977, 1019-1020 (2009/2010).
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realities of the student populations that SROs serve could result
in fewer searches, less frequent handcuffing, and reduced
physical contact between SROs and students. Additionally, such
training could provide clearer standards for SROs’ actions in
these situations, and these standards could be used to buttress
and Section 1983 claims that arise after the training is initiated.
This training would also equip SROs with better knowledge and
resources for the students they serve.228 Notably, some states
already include training requirements in their SRO legislation,
so such a policy is not outside the realm of possibility.
VI. Conclusion
Students’ Section 1983 claims against SROs provide
another window into the criminalization of America’s school
children. The cases detailed above, most of which result in
unsuccessful claims against SROs, illustrate the hallway-level
effects of both the criminalization trend in American education
and the diminished rights of students. They demonstrate how
the involvement of police in routine school discipline matters can
quickly escalate these situations to include aggressive, physical
confrontations and arrests. They also illustrate the extreme
limits on students’ rights to control their persons and
possessions in the name of maintaining order in their schools.
While Section 1983 claims theoretically offer an avenue for
students to push back when criminalization and rights
suppression go too far, this remedy proves to be insufficient
because the laws are so strongly tilted in favor of student control.
Applicable laws and school rules commonly proscribe student
behavior that is barely disruptive, permitting SROs and other
school officials to search, restrain, arrest, and otherwise punish
students under color of law. Likewise, the treatment of SROs as
school officials blurs their role in school and the permissible
parameters of their interactions with students, which further
frustrates seemingly viable civil rights claims against them.

228. See John Rosiak, How Mental Health Training Helps School
Resource Officers, 9 COMMUNITY POLICING DISPATCH (Feb. 2016),
https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/02-2016/mental_health_and_sros.asp.
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Therefore, legislation at either the state or federal level that
specifically guides the conduct of SROs is needed. Such
legislation should clarify their status as law enforcement officers
in their interactions with students. This would make it clear
that they must have probable cause to search students and that
the Miranda rules apply when they question students.
Legislation should also place restrictions on SROs’ use of force
against students, including limitations on shackling, which will
better protect students against excessive use of force by SROs.
Finally, comprehensive training that specifically speaks to the
social, emotional, and intellectual realities of the student
population is needed. This will enable SROs to more frequently
avoid justice system responses to student misbehavior.
Collectively, these changes will both bolster students’ rights in
their interactions with SROs and empower SROs to better serve
the students that they have agreed to protect, guide, and
counsel.
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